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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to verify whether non-audit services are provided without additional fees at the initial 
audit as a strategy to win an external audit contract, which could give the appearance of initial audit fee discount. 
From the results, non-audit services are provided at the initial audit, and the initial audit fee is discounted accordingly, 
only when the independent auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm. However, 
there is no meaningful relevance in any other types of changes. Therefore, if the auditor is changed from a Big 4 
accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, non-audit services are provided without additional fees in order to 
win an external audit contract, and the publication of audit fees with a division between the audit service fee and the 
non-audit service fee may give the appearance of a discounted audit service fee. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n independent auditor generally provides audit service and non-audit services simultaneously if the 
audit is continuously maintained. For an independent auditor, maintaining a close and long-term 
relationship with an auditee is essential in providing a profitable non-audit service. This tendency is 
empirically verified by Beck et al. (1988a), who showed that a company purchasing repetitive non-audit services such 
as taxation, pension or information system from an independent auditor has a longer audit service period by the same 
auditor. 
 
However, more auditors provide an audit service and non-audit services simultaneously after being appointed as an 
independent auditor, even though it is initial audit. Although not considered a general matter, certain exceptional 
factors may apply. In this research, we focus on the provision of non-audit services without additional fees by an 
accounting firm in order to win an external audit contract. Therefore, a new auditor is more likely to receive a level 
of total fees similar to those paid to the predecessor, while also providing additional non-audit services which were 
not provided by the predecessor. Moreover, although additional fees are not charged for these non-audit services 
provided, the officially reported audit fees are lower than those of the previous auditor because of the published 
division of audit fees and non-audit fees, which can be misrepresented as an initial audit fee discount. 
 
The purpose of this research is to verify whether accounting firms provide non-audit services without additional fees 
at the initial audit as a strategy to win an audit contract, which could give the appearance of a discounted initial audit 
fee. According to previous research, this tendency is expected to occur when the independent auditor is changed to a 
small auditor. Therefore, whether the relevance between an audit fee discount at the initial audit and the provision of 
non-audit services is dependent on the type of auditor change is verified through an empirical analysis.  
 
  
A 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature Review 
 
DeAngelo (1981) suggested the theoretical possibility of an initial audit fee discount based on the start-up cost of the 
initial audit and the transactional costs of an auditor change. This indicates that the start-up cost of a new auditor and 
the auditor conversion cost of the auditee, which are generated at auditor change, allow the current auditor to use 
quasi-rents, and that the auditor trying to acquire a new contract may suggest an initial audit fee discount based on 
predictable future quasi-rents. Many previous studies suggested such an initial audit fee discount phenomenon (Francis 
and Simon 1987; Simon and Francis 1988; Walker and Casterella 2000; Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Desir et al. 
2014).  
 
However, Dye (1991) approached audit fees from the perspective of information, and thus argued that the initial audit 
fee discount is not a transactional cost suggested by DeAngelo (1981), but it is based on the assumption of the 
bargaining power of the auditor in the process of deciding the audit fee. In other words, he expected that if the company 
under audit has all of bargaining power in the process of deciding audit fees, no initial audit fee discount will be 
offered since there are no future rents for the auditor. Therefore, if audit fees are published, the effect of future quasi-
rents is decreased, and no more initial audit fee discount will be offered. Subsequently, Craswell and Francis (1999) 
presented an empirical result based on data in Australia showing that no initial audit fee discount is offered except in 
the case of escalation change from non-Big8 to Big8. 
 
Studies on non-audit services have focused on the independence issue of the auditor through simultaneous provision 
of audit and non-audit services. Since the simultaneous provision of audit service and non-audit services might disrupt 
the independence of the auditor due to the close relationship between the auditor and the company under audit, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required the publication of non-audit services from 2001. In relation 
to this, Dee et al. (2002) suggested that the accrual is increased as the portion of non-audit fees increases. In particular, 
Frankel et al. (2002) presented a negative association between the portion of non-audit services fee at the publication 
of audit fees and the stock returns. 
 
However, even the portion of fees for non-audit services has consistently increased. Antle et al. (2006) proposed a 
negative association between non-audit services fee and abnormal accrual based on the knowledge transfer 
phenomenon due to the simultaneous provision of non-audit services. Moreover, DeFond et al. (2002) proposed that 
there is no meaningful relation between the portion of non-audit services fee and the auditor's opinion on the 
uncertainty for going-concern business, and argued that this is based on the auditor’s reputation. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
In consideration of the knowledge transfer phenomenon due to simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services 
mostly presented by the previous research related to non-audit services, the simultaneous and repetitive provision of 
non-audit services is considered possible in a continuous audit. The non-audit services that are provided based on 
information of the company under audit collected from an audit increases profits. Therefore, the non-audit services 
are provided more frequently during the continuous audit period than the initial audit year.  
 
However, in consideration of the fact that the initial audit fee discount arises due to the competition between auditors 
to win an audit contract, a different supposition can be postulated. In the case of a large auditor (BIG), which has a 
relative cost advantage due to its size (or technical efficiency based on industrial expertise), the initial audit fee 
discount may be large due to the quasi-rents during the future audit period, whereas the inferior small auditor (non-
BIG) presents a limited initial audit fee discount (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990). At this time, the small auditor (non-
BIG), which has a limited initial audit fee discount, will establish a strategy to win a new audit contract through other 
measures rather than the initial audit fee discount. In other words, it will provide the initial audit and additional non-
audit services simultaneously, which may induce the possibility to follow a non-pricing strategy rather than a pricing 
strategy using the initial audit fee discount, which is limited compared to that of the large auditor (BIG). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is postulated. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2017 Volume 33, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 97 The Clute Institute 
Hypothesis 1: (In a situation where the non-audit services are relatively unusual at the initial audit year) The initial 
audit where a large auditor (BIG) is changed to a small auditor (non-BIG), non-audit services will probably be offered. 
 
The unreasonable audit fees could be a sign as the possibility of disrupting the auditor’ independence to the 
information user. If the audit fees are below a certain level, the economic relationship based on quasi-rents for the 
future audit period can be assumed, and if the audit fees exceed a certain level, then an audit opinion may be purchased. 
At this time, in consideration of the high quality of audit from a large auditor (BIG), there is no benefit in changing to 
a small auditor (non-BIG) from a large auditor (BIG) at higher audit fees, so it is likely for a small auditor (non-BIG) 
to offer lower audit fees (DeAngelo 1981; Becker et al. 1998).  
 
However, the non-pricing strategy to provide non-audit services simultaneously may be a practical alternative since 
the issue of the auditor’s independence may be raised due to the significantly lower audit fees and discounts are limited 
due to the poor cost advantage compared to a large auditor (BIG). This strategy may avoid the independence issue by 
maintaining similar audit fees compared to the large auditor (BIG), while obtaining a discount effect of audit fees by 
providing non-audit services simultaneously. Therefore, a small auditor provides additional non-audit services similar 
to the total fees provided by a large auditor (BIG) to compete against the large auditor (BIG) by discounting the fees 
per service. Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services is probably offered in the case of changing 
to a small auditor (non-BIG) from a large auditor (BIG). 
 
SELECTION OF SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Selection of Sample 
 
We analyze the listed companies on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2003 to 2014. We collect financial data and 
corporate governance data from the KISVALUE database and audit fees and non-audit service fees from TS-2000. 
We select firms with a December 31 fiscal year-end. Lastly, we exclude firms that belong to the financial industry. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample size is 11,578 observations. 
 
Research Model  
 
We estimate the relation between non-audit services and auditor change using Equation (1). In order to calculate the 
probability of a client receiving a non-audit service, we use the results of the following logit model: 
 𝑝 𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑅&'( = 𝛼+ + 𝛼-𝐵𝐼𝐺12134567 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐵𝐼𝐺_𝐵𝐼𝐺67 + 𝛼;𝐵𝐼𝐺_𝐵𝐼𝐺67 + 𝛼<𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐵𝐼𝐺_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐵𝐼𝐺67 +𝛼=𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇67 + 𝛼@𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸67 + 𝛼C𝐿𝐸𝑉67 + 𝛼E𝐺𝑅𝑊67 + 𝛼G𝑀𝐵67 + 𝛼-+𝑅𝑂𝐴67 + 𝛼--𝐶𝐹𝑂67 + 𝛼-8𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅67 +𝛼-;𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐼67 	+ 𝛼-<𝐵𝐼𝐺467 + 𝛼-=𝐾𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐼67 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝑒 (1) 
 
NASF_D: 1 if the client receives non-audit services for auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG_NONBIG: 1 if changes a large auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise; 
NONBIG_BIG: 1 if changes a small auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG_BIG: 1 if changes a large auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise; 
NONBIG_NONBIG: 1 if changes a small auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise; 
LAST: 1 if last audit and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE: The natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV: Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
GRW: Sales divided by beginning sales; 
MB: Market value divided by book value; 
ROA: Net income divided by lagged total assets; 
CFO: Operating cash flow divided by total assets; 
OWNER: Ownership of largest shareholder and related parties; 
FORGI: Foreign ownership; 
BIG4: 1 if auditor is a large auditor called Big 4 and 0 otherwise; 
KOSPI: 1 if firms are listed in KOSPI and 0 otherwise; 
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IND: industry dummy 
YD: year dummy 
 
Our variables of interest are BIG_NONBIG, NONBIG_BIG, BIG_BIG and NONBIG_NONBIG. We expect that the 
probability of a client receiving a non-audit services are more pronounced for firms changing a large auditor to a small 
auditor. Therefore, we predict α1 to be positive or not significant but α2, α3, α4 to be negative in support of H1. We 
include control variables (LAST, SIZE, LEV, GRW, MB, ROA, CFO, OWNER, FORGI, BIG4, KOSPI) as in Kim 
et al. (2016).  
 
We estimate the relation the initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services and types of auditor change using 
Equation (2): 
 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹67 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽-𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸67 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑈𝐷VW4 − 467 + 𝛽;𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸67 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷VW467 + 𝛽<𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑇67 +𝛽=𝑅𝑂𝐴67Z- + 𝛽@𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆67Z- + 𝛽C𝐿𝐸𝑉67Z- + 𝛽E𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸67Z- + 𝛽G𝐺𝑅𝑊67Z- + 𝛽-+𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂67Z- +𝛽--𝐿𝐼𝑄67Z- 		+ 𝛽-8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅67Z- + 𝛽-;𝑀𝐵67Z- + 𝛽-<𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅67 + 𝛽-=𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐼67 (2) 
 
lnAF: The natural logarithm of audit fee; 
lnNASFEE: The natural logarithm of non-audit fee; 
AUD_CH1-4;  
(1) BIG_NONBIG: 1 if changes a large auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise; 
(2) NONBIG_BIG: 1 if changes a small auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise; 
(3) BIG_BIG: 1 if changes a large auditor to a large auditor and 0 otherwise; 
(4) NONBIG_NONBIG: 1 if changes a small auditor to a small auditor and 0 otherwise; 
LOSS: 1 if a firm reports loss and 0 otherwise; 
EXPRATIO: international sales divided by sales; 
LIQ: current asset divided current liability 
INVAR: Receivables and inventory divided by total assets; 
OPINO: 1 if audit opinion is clean and 0 otherwise; 
 
Our variable of interest is lnNASFEEit*AUD_CH. Then we perform a regression analysis using Equation (2) across 
subsamples of firms with audit change type (AUD_CH1-4). The variables AUD_CH1-4 are BIG_NONBIG, 
NONBIG_BIG, BIG_BIG and NONBIG_NONBIG. We only expect a negative coefficient of lnNASFEE*AUD_CH1 
(BIG_NONBIG) in line with Hypothesis 2. The control variable LART, ROA, LOSS, LEV is a proxy for audit risk 
and SIZE, GRW, EXPRATO are a proxy for client size (Simunic 1980; Francis 1984). We also include liquidity 
control variables (LIQ and INVAR) and corporate governance control variables (OWNER, FORGI). Simunic (1980) 
and Francis (1984) demonstrated that audit fees are positively associated with auditor’s disqualified opinion, so we 
include audit opinion. We control for Book value to Market value (MB), because Book value to Market value captures 
various factors to audit fees in growing firms. Lastly, for all specifications of the research model, we include industry 
and year dummy to control for industry and year effects. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in Equations (1) and (2) for the full sample. The mean 
NASF_D is 28.95% and the mean of lnNASFEE is 4.8669. The mean (median) of lnAF is 18.0058 (17.9099). FIRST 
is 15.40 %. The mean of the interesting variables BIG_NONBIG is 3.21%. 
 
Table 2, Panel A shows the Pearson correlation among the variables used in Equation (1) and Panel B shows the 
Pearson correlation among the variables used in Equation (2). The variable NASF_D shows a significant negative 
correlation at 1% significance level with the variable BIG_NONBIG. This result reveals a negative relation between 
non-audit services and changing from a large auditor to a small auditor. The lnAF and NONBIG_BIG variables show 
a significant negative correlation, which means that audit fees are negatively associated with firm changes from a 
large auditor to a small auditor. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Min 1st Median 3rd Max 
NASF_D 0.2895 0.4536 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
lnNASFEE 4.8669 7.6628 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 15.4249 19.9054 
lnAF 18.0058 0.6417 16.8112 17.5958 17.9099 18.2582 20.2124 
FIRST 0.1540 0.3610 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LAST 0.1536 0.3605 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG_NONBIG 0.0321 0.1764 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
NONBIG_BIG 0.0279 0.1647 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG_BIG 0.0478 0.2135 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
NONBIG_NONBIG 0.0461 0.2098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SIZE 25.6612 1.3582 23.2805 24.7398 25.3954 26.3203 30.2485 
LEV 0.4086 0.1963 0.0404 0.2518 0.4081 0.5553 0.8779 
GRW 1.1049 0.3572 0.3342 0.9380 1.0590 1.1968 2.9226 
MB 1.3333 1.2299 0.1848 0.5976 0.9500 1.5937 7.7098 
ROA 0.0122 0.1140 -0.5681 -0.0007 0.0308 0.0678 0.2128 
CFO 0.0496 0.1008 -0.2641 -0.0043 0.0472 0.1034 0.3469 
OWNER 0.2693 0.1382 0.0474 0.1655 0.2422 0.3482 0.6999 
FOR 0.0633 0.1123 0.0000 0.0014 0.0114 0.0692 0.5613 
BIG4 0.5449 0.4980 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
KOSPI 0.4222 0.4939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
LAG_ROA 0.0177 0.1133 -0.5504 0.0030 0.0342 0.0739 0.2235 
LAG_LOSS 0.2345 0.4237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LAG_SIZE 25.5854 1.3616 23.2381 24.6572 25.3218 26.2473 30.1817 
LAG_LEV 0.4071 0.1952 0.0433 0.2517 0.4057 0.5520 0.8751 
LAG_GRW 1.1296 0.4001 0.3405 0.9483 1.0704 1.2147 3.3131 
LAG_EXPRATIO 0.2699 0.3054 0.0000 0.0001 0.1285 0.5005 0.9865 
LAG_LIQ 2.5703 2.9318 0.2541 1.0514 1.5931 2.7697 19.2912 
LAG_INVAR 0.2782 0.1541 0.0000 0.1633 0.2670 0.3811 0.6785 
LAG_MB 1.3051 1.1964 0.1757 0.5806 0.9343 1.5808 7.4121 
LAG_OPINO 0.9977 0.0482 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Model 1 
(Table 1, Panel A continued on next page) 
 
  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
NASF_D(V1) 1.000        
BIG_NONBIG (V2) -0.032 1.000       
NONBIG_BIG (V3) -0.003 -0.031 1.000      
BIG_BIG (V4) 0.023 -0.041 -0.038 1.000     
NONBIG_NONBIG (V5) -0.060 -0.040 -0.037 -0.049 1.000    
LAST(V6) -0.038 -0.078 -0.072 -0.095 -0.094 1.000   
SIZE(V7) 0.192 -0.068 -0.010 0.142 -0.111 -0.038 1.000  
LEV(V8) -0.007 -0.020 0.006 0.024 -0.002 0.040 0.201 1.000 
GRW(V9) 0.005 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.022 -0.009 -0.023 0.045 
MB(V10) 0.044 -0.008 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.030 -0.096 0.066 
ROA(V11) 0.059 -0.003 0.015 0.032 -0.059 -0.082 0.196 -0.282 
CFO(V12) 0.068 -0.017 0.008 0.021 -0.050 -0.035 0.074 -0.184 
OWNER(V13) 0.023 -0.015 0.014 0.025 -0.025 -0.020 0.045 -0.021 
FOR(V14) 0.168 -0.053 -0.016 0.083 -0.077 -0.028 0.463 -0.103 
BIG4(V15) 0.171 -0.199 0.155 0.205 -0.241 -0.024 0.364 0.031 
KOSPI(V16) 0.121 -0.056 0.000 0.101 -0.058 0.000 0.552 0.103 
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Panel A. continued 
 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 
GRW(V9) 1.000        
MB(V10) 0.102 1.000       
ROA(V11) 0.188 -0.096 1.000      
CFO(V12) 0.089 0.028 0.449 1.000     
OWNER(V13) -0.010 -0.062 0.131 0.071 1.000    
FOR(V14) -0.008 0.110 0.181 0.155 0.022 1.000   
BIG4(V15) -0.021 -0.009 0.092 0.082 0.092 0.243 1.000  
KOSPI(V16) -0.066 -0.166 0.075 -0.025 0.040 0.263 0.237 1.000 
 
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Model 2 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 
lnAF (V1) 1.000         
lnNASFEE (V2) 0.259 1.000        
BIG_NONBIG (V3) -0.098 -0.036 1.000       
NONBIG_BIG (V4) -0.028 -0.002 -0.031 1.000      
BIG_BIG (V5) 0.116 0.025 -0.041 -0.038 1.000     
NONBIG_NONBIG (V6) -0.100 -0.063 -0.040 -0.037 -0.049 1.000    
LAG_ROA (V7) 0.055 0.055 -0.038 -0.005 0.024 -0.069 1.000   
LAG_LOSS (V8) -0.055 -0.045 0.033 -0.002 -0.019 0.048 -0.706 1.000  
LAG_SIZE (V9) 0.815 0.222 -0.072 -0.013 0.136 -0.113 0.173 -0.155 1.000 
LAG_LEV (V10) 0.239 0.004 -0.014 0.009 0.021 0.001 -0.288 0.221 0.221 
LAG_GRW (V11) -0.021 0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.012 0.003 0.191 -0.156 -0.018 
LAG_EXPRATIO (V12) 0.070 0.027 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.020 0.028 0.017 0.075 
LAG_LIQ (V13) -0.209 0.007 0.024 -0.011 -0.022 0.017 0.119 -0.072 -0.215 
LAG_INVAR (V4) -0.168 -0.079 0.013 0.021 -0.043 0.007 0.091 -0.092 -0.168 
LAG_MB (V15) 0.071 0.049 0.004 0.011 0.018 0.022 -0.069 0.072 -0.088 
OWNER (V16) -0.004 0.022 -0.015 0.014 0.025 -0.025 0.124 -0.086 0.043 
FOR (V17) 0.436 0.189 -0.053 -0.016 0.083 -0.077 0.184 -0.149 0.456 
LAG_OPINO (V18) 0.000 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.027 -0.028 0.013 
 
 
Panel B. continued 
 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 
LAG_LEV (V10) 1.000         
LAG_GRW (V11) 0.041 1.000        
LAG_EXPRATIO (V12) 0.049 0.008 1.000       
LAG_LIQ (V13) -0.619 -0.035 -0.014 1.000      
LAG_INVAR (V4) 0.188 0.079 0.029 -0.144 1.000     
LAG_MB (V15) 0.062 0.111 0.011 0.042 -0.077 1.000    
OWNER (V16) -0.020 -0.013 -0.056 0.035 0.016 -0.059 1.000   
FOR (V17) -0.088 0.009 0.015 0.029 -0.128 0.109 0.022 1.000  
LAG_OPINO (V18) -0.022 0.004 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 1.000 
1) The lower triangle presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Boldfaced figures are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Model 1 
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BIG4(V15) -0.021 -0.009 0.092 0.082 0.092 0.243 1.000  
KOSPI(V16) -0.066 -0.166 0.075 -0.025 0.040 0.263 0.237 1.000 
 
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Model 2 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 
lnAF (V1) 1.000         
lnNASFEE (V2) 0.259 1.000        
BIG_NONBIG (V3) -0.098 -0.036 1.000       
NONBIG_BIG (V4) -0.028 -0.002 -0.031 1.000      
BIG_BIG (V5) 0.116 0.025 -0.041 -0.038 1.000     
NONBIG_NONBIG (V6) -0.100 -0.063 -0.040 -0.037 -0.049 1.000    
LAG_ROA (V7) 0.055 0.055 -0.038 -0.005 0.024 -0.069 1.000   
LAG_LOSS (V8) -0.055 -0.045 0.033 -0.002 -0.019 0.048 -0.706 1.000  
LAG_SIZE (V9) 0.815 0.222 -0.072 -0.013 0.136 -0.113 0.173 -0.155 1.000 
LAG_LEV (V10) 0.239 0.004 -0.014 0.009 0.021 0.001 -0.288 0.221 0.221 
LAG_GRW (V11) -0.021 0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.012 0.003 0.191 -0.156 -0.018 
LAG_EXPRATIO (V12) 0.070 0.027 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.020 0.028 0.017 0.075 
LAG_LIQ (V13) -0.209 0.007 0.024 -0.011 -0.022 0.017 0.119 -0.072 -0.215 
LAG_INVAR (V4) -0.168 -0.079 0.013 0.021 -0.043 0.007 0.091 -0.092 -0.168 
LAG_MB (V15) 0.071 0.049 0.004 0.011 0.018 0.022 -0.069 0.072 -0.088 
OWNER (V16) -0.004 0.022 -0.015 0.014 0.025 -0.025 0.124 -0.086 0.043 
FOR (V17) 0.436 0.189 -0.053 -0.016 0.083 -0.077 0.184 -0.149 0.456 
LAG_OPINO (V18) 0.000  0.011  0.009  0.008  0.002  0.002  0.027  -0.028  0.013  
(Table 2, Panel B continued on next page) 
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Panel B. Continued 
 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 
LAG_LEV (V10) 1.000         
LAG_GRW (V11) 0.041 1.000        
LAG_EXPRATIO (V12) 0.049 0.008 1.000       
LAG_LIQ (V13) -0.619 -0.035 -0.014 1.000      
LAG_INVAR (V4) 0.188 0.079 0.029 -0.144 1.000     
LAG_MB (V15) 0.062 0.111 0.011 0.042 -0.077 1.000    
OWNER (V16) -0.020 -0.013 -0.056 0.035 0.016 -0.059 1.000   
FOR (V17) -0.088 0.009 0.015 0.029 -0.128 0.109 0.022 1.000  
LAG_OPINO (V18) -0.022 0.004 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 1.000 
 
 
Results for the Study Hypotheses 
 
Table 3 provides the results of Equation (1) to test hypothesis 1. The non-audit services and initial audit have a 
significant negative association. However, the results reveal no significant relationship between non-audit services 
and the change from a large auditor to a small auditor. The result suggests that in the case of an initial audit where a 
large auditor is changed to a small auditor, non-audit services will likely be provided. 
 
 
Table 3.  Results of Hypothesis 1 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -6.6320*** (<.0001) -6.6560*** (<.0001) 
FIRST -0.2592*** (<.0001)   
BIG_NONBIG   -0.0834 (0.5398) 
NONBIG_BIG   -0.3043** (0.0221) 
BIG_BIG   -0.3184*** (0.0015) 
NONBIG_NONBIG   -0.2624** (0.0362) 
LAST -0.2889*** (<.0001) -0.2895*** (<.0001) 
SIZE 0.2120*** (<.0001) 0.2122*** (<.0001) 
LEV -0.4402*** (0.0005) -0.4380*** (0.0006) 
GRW -0.0006 (0.9926) 0.0001 (0.9993) 
MV 0.1030*** (<.0001) 0.1034*** (<.0001) 
ROA -0.2735 (0.2523) -0.2770 (0.2465) 
CFO 0.7791*** (0.0015) 0.7818*** (0.0014) 
OWNER 0.2303 (0.1390) 0.2304 (0.1389) 
FORGI 0.7320*** (0.0007) 0.7322*** (0.0007) 
BIG4 0.4997*** (<.0001) 0.5184*** (<.0001) 
KOSPI 0.1834*** (0.0009) 0.1843*** (0.0009) 
IND Included Included 
YD Included Included 
Max-rescaled R2 0.1170 0.1173 
Likelihood Ration 989.2028*** 991.32777*** 
# of NASF=1 3,352 3,352 
# of NASF=0 8,226 8,226 
Obs. 11,578 11,578 
1) Variable definition FIRST: 1 if audit is initial audit and otherwise 0. Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 reports the results of Equation (2) to test hypothesis 2. Consistent with hypothesis 2, we find that the 
coefficients on AUD_CH*lnNASFEE are significantly negative for the third column, which shows Equation (2) by 
using AUD_CH as a proxy for BIG_NONBIG (-0.1571, t=-3.56). However, we find no significant relationship 
between lnAF and AUD_CH2*lnNASFEE, AUD_CH3*lnNASFEE and AUD_CH4*lnNASFEE. The result suggest 
that the initial audit fee discount in terms of non-audit services is probably offered in the case of changing to a small 
auditor from a large auditor. We continue to find evidence generally supporting our hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4. Results of Hypothesis 2 
 Proxy for AUD_CH 
FIRST BIG_NONBIG NONBIG_BIG BIG_BIG NONBIG_NONBIG 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Intercept 8.6303*** 8.6618*** 8.6282*** 8.6318*** 8.6459*** 
(82.68) (83.06) (82.52) (82.31) (82.53) 
lnNASFEE 0.0061*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 
(12.98) (13.55) (13.31) (13.15) (13.26) 
AUD_CH -0.0467*** -0.1159*** -0.0412* 0.0109 -0.0213 
(-4.38) (-5.67) (-1.78) (0.58) (-1.26) 
AUD_CH* 
lnNASFEE 
-0.0026** -0.1571*** -0.0501 -0.0276 -0.0551 
(-2.14) (-3.56) (-1.16) (-0.87) (-1.36) 
LAST 0.0070 -0.2929*** -0.2893*** -0.2882*** -0.2898*** 
(0.75) (-6.97) (-6.86) (-6.83) (-6.87) 
LAG_ROA -0.2945*** 0.0204* 0.0201* 0.0201* 0.0200* 
(-6.99) (1.90) (1.87) (1.87) (1.86) 
LAG_LOSS 0.0200* 0.3665*** 0.3676*** 0.3675*** 0.3670*** 
(1.86) (116.17) (116.26) (115.56) (115.73) 
LAG_LEV 0.14805*** -0.0175** -0.0170** -0.01684** -0.0168** 
(6.24) (-2.09) (-2.04) (-2.01) (-2.01) 
LAG_SIZE 0.3677*** 0.1471*** 0.1468*** 0.1481*** 0.1487*** 
(116.47) (6.21) (6.18) (6.23) (6.26) 
LAG_GRW -0.01782** 0.0081 0.00849 0.00847 0.0080 
(-2.13) (0.68) (0.71) (0.71) (0.68) 
LAG_EXPRATIO 0.00742 -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.00553*** -0.0054*** 
(0.62) (-3.84) (-3.95) (-3.91) (-3.87) 
LAG_LIQ -0.00546*** 0.0077 0.0065 0.00559 0.0049 
(-3.86) (0.33) (0.28) (0.23) (0.21) 
LAG_INVAR 0.00519 0.0549*** 0.0552*** 0.05502*** 0.0549*** 
(0.22) (18.66) (18.69) (18.62) (18.59) 
LAG_MB 0.05537*** -0.1041*** -0.0999*** -0.10108*** -0.1022*** 
(18.77) (-4.44) (-4.25) (-4.3) (-4.35) 
OWNER -0.0993*** 0.3961*** 0.3995*** 0.40225*** 0.4009*** 
(-4.23) (11.61) (11.67) (11.75) (11.72) 
FORGI 0.39731*** -0.08344 -0.08724 -0.08792 -0.08762 
(11.63) (-1.26) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.32) 
LAG_OPINO -0.08546 -0.0933*** -0.0862*** -0.08714*** -0.0879*** 
(-1.29) (-5.74) (-5.29) (-5.35) (-5.4) 
IND Included Included Included Included Included 
YD Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.7156 0.7164 0.7146 0.7144 0.7146 
Obs. 11578 11578 11578 11578 11578 
1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Additional Tests 
 
 In this section, we conduct sensitivity tests to verify whether the above results are robust using the extended model. 
We present a regression analysis that incorporates the four audit change variables, BIG_NONBIG, NONBIG_BIG, 
BIG_BIG, and NONBIG_NONBIG, and the four interaction variables, lnNASFEE* BIG_NONBIG, lnNASFEE* 
NONBIG_BIG, lnNASFEE* BIG_BIG, and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_NONBIG.   
 
The results are consistent with our hypotheses, and we find that the coefficients on lnNASFEE* BIG_NONBIG are 
significantly negative for the extended model. The results reveal no significant relationship between audit fees (lnAF) 
and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_BIG, lnNASFEE* BIG_BIG, and lnNASFEE* NONBIG_NONBIG. However, audit fees 
have the significantly negative association with non-audit fees when changing from a large auditor to a small auditor.   
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Table 5. Results of Hypothesis 2 by Using the Extended Model 
 Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Intercept 8.6748*** (82.87) 
lnNASFEE 0.0062*** (13.35) 
BIG_NONBIG -0.1206*** (-5.88) 
NONBIG_BIG -0.0497** (-2.15) 
BIG_BIG 0.0032 (0.17) 
NONBIG_NONBIG -0.0312* (-1.84) 
lnNASFEE* BIG_NONBIG -0.1608*** (-3.64) 
lnNASFEE* NONBIG_BIG -0.0542 (-1.26) 
lnNASFEE* BIG_BIG -0.0326 (-1.03) 
lnNASFEE* NONBIG_NONBIG -0.0592 (-1.47) 
LAG_ROA -0.2977*** (-7.08) 
LAG_LOSS 0.0201* (1.87) 
LAG_LEV 0.1474*** (6.22) 
LAG_LEV 0.3660*** (115.18) 
LAG_GRW -0.0180** (-2.16) 
LAG_EXPRATIO 0.0073 (0.61) 
LAG_LIQ -0.0054*** (-3.82) 
LAG_INVAR 0.0075 (0.32) 
LAG_MB 0.0552*** (18.73) 
OWNER -0.1027*** (-4.38) 
FORGI 0.3902*** (11.44) 
LAG_OPINO -0.0814 (-1.23) 
IND Included 
YD Included 
Adj. R2 0.7168 
Obs. 11578 
1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
2) See TABLE 1 for definition for other variables. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this research is to verify whether non-audit services are provided without additional fees at the initial 
audit as a strategy to win an external audit contract, which could give the appearance of initial audit fee discount. The 
results are as follows. 
 
Similar to Beck et al. (1988a), it is reconfirmed that non-audit services are generally not provided simultaneously in 
the case of an initial audit. However, if the type of auditor change is classified, and if it is changed from a Big 4 
accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, it tends to provide non-audit services at initial audit unlike other 
change types. This result suggests that a non-Big 4 accounting firm may use non-audit services in order to win external 
audit contracts. In order to verify this, entire samples are divided into four groups according to the types of auditor 
change and verified. As a result, non-audit services are provided at the initial audit, and the initial audit fee is appeared 
to be discounted accordingly, only when the independent auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-
Big 4 accounting firm. However, there is no meaningful relevance in any other types of changes. Therefore, if the 
auditor is changed from a Big 4 accounting firm to a non-Big 4 accounting firm, non-audit services are provided 
without additional fees in order to win an external audit contract, and the publication of audit fees with a division 
between the audit service fee and the non-audit service fee may give the appearance of a discounted audit service fee. 
 
This research has scientific value in being the first investigation of the relevance between the initial audit fee discount 
and non-audit services according to the auditor change. Moreover, this research raises the issue regarding the actual 
nature of the non-audit services provided at initial audit. Since it should provide an audit service and non-audit service 
within the total fees similar to the audit service fee of the predecessor, the audit hours will be definitely decreased and, 
therefore, the quality of the audit will likely be degraded. Therefore, the accounting regulation agency needs to pay 
more attention to the type of auditor change and non-audit services which would be provided at the initial audit. And 
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the description and nature of the non-audit services provided at the initial audit should be published to protect 
investors, and the adequacy of the total fees and audit and non-audit service fees needs to be reviewed more carefully. 
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